Dec
12
Deliberative Democracy: Mitigating Struggles of the Modern-Day Political System by Informing both Representatives and The Public
Filed Under Deliberative Democracy, From the Field | Leave a Comment
Isabella Farrington graduated this past spring as a politics and international relations major with an American politics concentration and a minor in studio art.
This post is the third of this season of From the Field. If you have not yet done so, please read this brief post by the series editor introducing our focus for the season.
The episode “What Deliberative Democracy Can, and Can’t, Do” from the podcast The Gray Area with Seal Illing features political scientist Jane Mansbridge on addressing problems within civic engagement with deliberative democracy. They speak to the history of the US political atmosphere, and what polarization, civic engagement, and partisanship actually looks like, highlighting party sorting, mass media, and affluent voices as the main drivers of polarization and an uninformed public. In response, Mansbridge argues that deliberative democracy is a method of civic engagement that cultivates informed citizens and representatives to encourage good decision-making, while navigating the problems of the political systems and natural human tendencies. The benefits and limits of deliberative democracy are intricately connected to many important aspects of public opinion, including how informed the public is, the structure of political communication in the modern age, and psychological and epistemological factors of being human. Based on these concepts and Mansbridge and Illings’ conversation, deliberative democracy provides an opportunity to mitigate problems of reactionary and structural tendencies within the political system towards a more representative and intentional decision-making atmosphere, especially in the face of party sorting.
To start, drawing on arguments from Morris Fiorina, Mansbridge recites how political parties have become more “homogenous” on the elite level (as independents have moved to one party or the other), and also further apart on the ideological scale (Illing 2019, 3:50; Glynn et al. 2015, 265). In many ways, this party sorting makes it harder for representatives to compromise as opinions on issues are farther apart. Further, when parties are not only less ideologically moderate, but political systems encourage competition, communication and actions on issues become more entertainment or persuasion-based, rather than constructive. Mansbridge explains how increased competition, because of increased elite polarization, incentivizes parties to “win” rather than collaborate. In other words, competition “pays each party to destroy the other” (Illing 2019, 9:50). Decreased tolerance of dissenting views, as exemplified by strong partisan public figures and representatives, interferes with the system’s ability to serve the citizenry’s legitimate interests (Glynn et al. 2015, 266). In part, increased political competition is shown through mass media developments.
Historically and today, modern mass media has intensified political debate to sensationalism, biased coverage, and even libelous attacks on the opposition, often driven by monetary incentives (Glynn et al. 2015, 332). While there is the concern that media in this form could diminish political tolerance for dissenting views within the elite and the public, the true extent of this impact is somewhat limited (333). Mansbridge and Illing discuss media in the context of nationalizing and globalizing awareness of politics and issues (Illing 2019, 15:00). They contemplate how increased access to information is both valuable to awareness and greatly influenced by bias and consumerist culture. That is, media and politics, have become products for citizens to consume and react to, not to interpret and evaluate (16:00). Social media is named here as especially polarizing, due to its algorithmic mechanisms (17:30; 43:30). Not to mention that general trend that media outlets do not have important statistical literacy for presenting public opinion and poll results (Asher 2017, 168). While deliberative democracy offers some ways to curb media influence, still more relevant to public opinion than media is party identification, in light of party sorting and affluent voices.
As party identification is the number one indicator of voting habits (Glynn et al. 2015, 245), party sorting poses concerns for deliberative democracy regarding collaboration and representation of voices. Research shows that more partisan Americans make use their voices more in every stage of the political process (266). Throughout the episode, Mansbridge references various similar distinctions that contribute to which citizens voices are louder than others, including partisanship, wealth, and education (Illing 2019, 11:45). These distinctions are commonly known to outline the knowledge gap: those who are more affluent have greater access to information, pay more attention, or learn more, increasing their likelihood of being active in the political sphere (Glynn et al. 2015, 341). Thus, most of the voices represented are not usually ordinary citizens, but those with greater resources for political engagement and those who are more partisan. In the same way that public opinion polls that do not have a representational sample are skewed, inaccurate, or limited in their conclusions (Asher 2017, 280), Congress members often misrepresent their constituents’ interests because they are only hearing the activist voices (Illing 27:30). The issue then becomes not only an uninformed public, but also uninformed representatives.
Deliberative democracy provides intentional practices and mechanisms for addressing the side effects of party sorting, mass media, and an uninformed public and Congress. Mansbridge utilizes the example of the “mini publics” practice, where randomized groups of citizens are brought together to speak about issues with representatives, but are given information and the intentional structure to discuss (Illing 2019, 29:45). A broader term to use would be deliberative opinion polls. Deliberative opinion polls, mini publics, and other similar practices measure what the public thinks when they have the opportunity to be informed on issues through discussion and study (45:45; Asher 2017, 201). Again, ensuring a sample is randomized prevents skewed results towards those who are more affluent and activist in the political sphere. To this effect, deliberative democracy practices bring ordinary citizens into the conversation, better informing representatives on the interests of their constituents (25:30; 34:45). Channels of communication are created between the stakeholders and the decision-makers, the citizens and the representatives.
Deliberative democracy also offers the opportunity to bridge partisan divides and mitigate emotional responses. An interesting statistic brought up in the podcast expresses that the percent of people who would be uncomfortable with their child marrying someone not of the same political party has increased from 5% to 70% (19:00). In other words, the social emotionality of political evaluation has greatly increased, as people have become more concerned with what others think and will accept, in relation to political views and tolerance (Glynn et al. 2015, 133). Naturally, people are both emotional and reactive, and yet rational. Psychological tendencies, including perception errors, emotions, and socialization, greatly influence the lens through which people engage and respond to politics (177-199). These tendencies are more inclined towards symbolic politics, seen through the increase of candidate-centered campaigns (363, 385). Deliberative democracy, because of its intentional format towards not only amplifying voices, but also equipping them, works to go beyond surface-level reactions towards better decision-making.
Deliberative democracy may also have long-term trickle-down effects. For instance, Mansbridge suggests that representatives be trained in negotiation (25:30). By doing so, not only would representatives be more able to accomplish their goals and gain a majority, but also would model bipartisanship and, possibly, decrease elite polarization. In a similar fashion, if media outlets were equipped with adequate poll literacy for reporting public opinion accurately and disincentivizing horse-race characterization of election reporting (Asher 2017, 193, 260). Presenting information in ways that encourage deliberate evaluation and opportunities for deliberate opinion formation may make such practices more present in education and social life, making regular people more prepared to participate in deliberative democracy (37). In other words, civic responsibility and civic education begin to integrate into day-to-day life by the methods of deliberative democracy.
Mansbridge argues that while there is an enmeshment of identity with politics and needs that stimulates partisan thinking, representatives are still looking to “get things done” for their constituents (Illing 2019, 21:00). Moreover, citizens want to engage with the issues they care about in deliberative processes (34:45). The trick is balancing the modern-day problems of a weighty policyscape, issue field, and increasingly bigger political world against the side effects of party sorting, media, and natural human tendencies. What is especially wise about Mansbridge’s argument is her acknowledgment that the more you require of people the more unrepresentative a sample will be, as you will only attract the activist, affluent voices (44:30). In fact, she argues that people do not always need to be deeply engaged or knowledgeable about politics all the time – that is part of the reason we have representatives (34). Instead, improving how communication between constituents and representatives can have important long-term effect in cultivating deliberative thinking in the public and in representatives (41). By implementing simple practices that engage more stakeholders in more constructive ways, deliberative democracy can work to channel our natural interests towards representative, informed decision making.
References
Glynn, Carroll J., Susan Herbst, Mark Lindeman, Garrett J. O’Keefe, and Robert Y. Shapiro. 2018. Public Opinion. Routledge.