Nov

13

The Promise but Inevitable Difficulty within the Socialist Party of America

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Louka Fetter is a junior majoring in both Politics and International Relations as well as Economics.

This post is the fifth of this season of From the Field.  If you have not yet done so, please read this brief post by the series editor introducing our focus for the season.

Despite record numbers of American voters declining to affiliate with either major party, both of which they increasingly doubt really represent their interests, the two-party stranglehold on American politics is as strong as ever. According to historic polling data, the percentage of voters identifying as independents has climbed from 31% to 43% in the past twenty years, while the percentage citing Republican or Democratic affiliation has plummeted. However, this century’s elections have seen a negligible number of ballots cast for third parties, which stands in stark contrast to a century ago when a variety of minor parties won meaningful shares of the vote. One such party was the Socialist Party of America, considered by some to be “the most important minor political party in the history of the United States in the twentieth century” because it achieved success in having many of its policy proposals implemented (xvii). However, a closer dive into the party’s history unveils a theme common to many minor parties in which its success – the implementation of its policy proposals – was also the reason for its downfall. Only through electoral reform allowing voters to express their genuine preference for their favorite candidate, such as ranked choice voting, might third parties be viable in future American elections.

The Socialist Party of America (Socialist Party) was founded in 1901 and experienced a swift rise to relevance in the decade that followed. The party enjoyed a quick ascent in part because it was formed from several existing groups, like the Populist movement and the Socialist Labor Party, allowing it to generate support from coal miners, laborers, and the working class (53). At first, the party differentiated itself as a left-wing alternative by proposing state involvement and asserting the futility of capitalism in proposing solutions to the economic issues of the day, including child labor, wealth inequality, and urban poverty. The party grew its support across the nation, enjoying its greatest electoral success in 1912 when it earned 900,000 votes in the presidential election – 6% of the total vote – and captured over a thousand offices across the nation (287). Bearing many of the hallmarks of a major party in development, the prevailing expectation by the 1910s was that the Socialist Party would continue to develop to compete as a major party in American politics (xvii).

However, the Socialist Party ultimately lost viability by suffering from the same fate that befell many other minor parties in American history. Throughout the early 1900s, the major parties absorbed and co-opted much of the ideology and policy proposals of the Socialist Party, rendering the party unable to present itself as a viable and differentiated alternative (51, 60). This phenomenon was especially apparent at two crucial points in the development of the Socialist Party – the elections of 1912 and the Great Depression – when the party’s viability was undercut at moments when it seemed poised to flourish. While 1912 did mark the party’s greatest success, the party was disappointed because it had expected to garner up to 3 million votes, and it fell short of expectations because of the major parties’ appeals to the same progressive and reform-minded base that the Socialists pursued (62). Democratic nominee Woodrow Wilson was a devoted progressive, and former Republican president Theodore Roosevelt was so left-wing to be accused by the Socialists of being excessive and insincere and “stealing the Socialist’s issues” (62). These two candidates garnered a significant number of votes that might have otherwise gone to the Socialist Party because they were perceived as more electorally viable options that would pursue similar left-wing policies.

The party fell victim to the same fate after it was granted new life with the difficult economic conditions surrounding the Great Depression, which increased its appeal (308). However, this revival was short-lived after Roosevelt and the Democratic Party advocated for many of the same policies as the Socialists in addressing the Depression through their New Deal platform. The Socialist Party had long advocated for major legislation including the shortening of the workday, increased inspection of factories, mines, and shops, an end to child labor, the prohibition on interstate shipment of goods made from child labor, a minimum wage law, and a graduated income tax. If many of these policies sound familiar, it is because they were implemented by Democrats as a part of the New Deal. Many supporters of these policies voted for the Democrats, a more viable electoral option, instead of the Socialist Party, with the hopes that these policies would be implemented. Moreover, many members of the Socialist Party increasingly left to join the Democrats after the passage of the New Deal because this success demonstrated the emergence of a viable way to implement left-wing policy. To the Socialist Party’s disillusionment, as soon as economic conditions arose that warranted the implementation of their left-wing policy, the Democrat Party was there to adopt and implement those policies as their own. As a result, the New Deal permanently destroyed the viability of the Socialist Party, for it failed to stand as either a clearly differentiated or electorally viable alternative to the major parties.

During two critical moments of the Socialist Party’s existence where success was anticipated, the party failed to prove itself as a feasible alternative. Both disappointments are largely due to the same phenomenon – the absorption of the Socialist Party’s positions by the major parties in America. Both major parties are very flexible and able to adapt to absorb different issues, movements, or ideologies to maintain the current two-party system (344). This development also serves to prevent minor parties from developing or maintaining a constituency, rendering them unable to supply voters with a differentiated and viable alternative and thereby affirming the two-party stranglehold on the American political system.

For minor parties to be viable in American politics, voters need an incentive to support them regardless of their chances of beating the two major parties, which might be accomplished through reforms like the implementation of ranked choice voting. Ranked choice voting is an electoral system recently implemented in several areas across the country where voters have the option to rank every candidate on the ballot according to their ordinal preferences (366). Ranked choice voting has been shown to increase the frequency of votes for minor parties by between 200% and nearly 400%, showing that “ranked-choice voting may play an important role in increasing the electoral performance of third-party candidates” (374). Ranked choice voting allows voters to express their first-choice vote for a minor party without having the fear of their vote being wasted when also choosing between the major parties. While there are some challenges with ranked-choice voting, like ballot exhaustion, the need for voter education, and the potential for voter confusion, this reform seems to represent the best option for promoting the success of minor parties.

The Socialist Party greatly influenced American politics through its advocacy of left-wing economic legislation that was eventually instituted as policy. However, the Socialist Party failed to achieve viability because its policies were absorbed by the major parties during two crucial episodes, the 1912 election and the Great Depression. As a result, the Socialist Party failed to gain lasting traction and ascend to major party status. Changes to the American voting system, such as ranked-choice voting, could allow for genuine party preferences to be expressed at the ballot box. Such a change might also provide an opportunity for various minor parties to increase in viability and contribute once more to the increased representativeness of the American political system.

Oct

9

The Know-Nothings and the Future of Third-Parties in America

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Jordan Gilman is a junior majoring in Politics and also in Economics.

This post is the fourth of this season of From the Field.  If you have not yet done so, please read this brief post by the series editor introducing our focus for the season.

Third parties in America are often seen as accessories to the political order, not serving a foundational role but still making their voices heard. Voting for a third party has been seen by some as lending a hand to the opposition, taking away much-needed votes from either Republicans or Democrats. For example, Hillary Clinton mailed over a million flyers that cautioned against voting for a third-party candidate in 2016, claiming that doing so helped Donald Trump. In recent elections, these organizations made enough of an impact to garner national attention but have failed to challenge America’s two-party system. The Know-Nothing movement in the 1850s was arguably America’s first third party, campaigning on issues related to immigration. Its existence was short-lived but still impactful, showing how voters across a deeply divided country were unified by nativist ideas. Even though this party has long been dead, its role as a release valve for discontent with the two-party system echoes across time and into the present day, providing insight into viable solutions towards increasing the role of third parties.

The Know-Nothing Party began in response to the overwhelming nativist sentiment of the 1850s and took advantage of the Whigs’ poor performance in addressing Catholic immigration. University of Virginia professor Michael Holt described how despite making nativist appeals, the Whigs rarely “acted against Catholics specifically” and lost touch with their working-class voters as a result (pg. 314). Even more than the Democrats, the Whigs were led by political elites insulated from the pressures of Catholic immigration. Without a party to represent these pressing issues, many Northerners turned to the Know-Nothing party, which had taken an abundantly clear stance on immigration despite its brief history.

Beginning as The Order of the Star Spangled Banner in 1850, this Nativist movement originally resembled a sort of secret society, urging its members to say that they “know nothing” of the party (pg. 6). Soon the Know-Nothings would become anything but secret, experiencing success in New York with lawyer Daniel Ullmann, who earned more than a quarter of all ballots cast in that state and its leading city to the shock of many onlookers (pg. 460). The party’s nativist appeals had struck a chord in New York, later diffusing to other areas in the Northeast and even across the country.

At its peak, the Know-Nothings were America’s first dominant third party, providing an alternative for voters dissatisfied with the political establishment. Unlike many grassroots movements, the Know-Nothings achieved political efficacy by electing over a hundred Congressmen, eight governors, a controlling share of state legislature seats across the country, and thousands of local politicians. The party even recruited former president (and Whig member) Millard Fillmore to run as a Know-Nothing in the 1956 election. Despite this surprising and seeming sudden success, the party failed to capture the Executive Branch, with Fillmore only winning one state in 1956 (pg. 30). The impact of the Know-Nothings was felt most acutely on the state level, transforming local politics in different ways in various states in the 1850s.

Taking an indecisive stance on slavery initially broadened the horizons of the Know-Nothing party but caused a reckoning when the nation moved towards civil war. From the Dred Scott ruling to the Lincoln-Douglas debates, there was no shortage of controversy over slavery and its future. The party was built around brushing slavery aside, hoping to find unity in other areas and create a truly national movement in the process. But in an era on the verge of civil war, there was no path toward unity without confronting slavery head-on. The Know-Nothings made the same fatal mistakes as the Whigs by underestimating the divisiveness of slavery. As the nation divided, the Know-Nothings became gradually more irrelevant, losing their role as a political force and instead becoming a party of the past. The Know-Nothings were a casualty on the way toward civil war, unable to sustain themselves amid better political alternatives.

Despite the death of this third party, the discontentment that fueled its rise still rings true centuries later in contemporary American politics. Issues continue to plague the American public that seems to be underrepresented in America, making many citizens dissatisfied with the two-party system. A proposed solution towards giving third parties more influence includes rank-choice voting, which (as its name suggests) allows candidates to be ranked in order of preference on a ballot. This system lowers the stakes for third parties, no longer facing an all-or-nothing dilemma. A survey experiment sought to understand the effectiveness of rank-choice voting, particularly related to third parties. The research found there to be a strong connection between hypothetical ranked-choice voting and support of third-party candidates (pg. 374). Respondents using RCV criteria showed nearly double the level of support of third parties in the 2020 election than those using a non-RVC system. RCV has the potential to create a more level political playing field and lend a helping hand to third parties.

Even though these conclusions made by Simmons and his team rely more on questionnaires than electoral data, RVC has shown results in real-world elections. For example, Alaska implemented this electoral reform in 2022, using it in elections for governor and Congress.  Maine has also been a proponent of RCV and has seen increased governmental approval ratings ever since. These well-documented benefits leave observers wondering why RCV is not more popular. A reason for its slow diffusion has been the hesitation of some conservatives, more reluctant to introduce this electoral reform. Research has found many voters to find the run-off model is more satisfying – especially in come-from-behind victories (pg. 36). Even more significant is the potential dissatisfaction voters will have with RCV once it becomes more familiar, losing its novelty and promising impacts. Only time will truly be able to tell the future of elections in America, but proponents are hopeful that these doubts will be overwhelmed by the resounding benefits of this electoral reform.

Today, third parties represent issues as diverse as environmental regulation to libertarian causes, all of which can have a unique contribution to the political atmosphere. Rank-choice voting helps these parties, providing a solution that keeps the broader electoral system intact while also introducing needed reform. By doing away with binary decisions at the ballot and moving towards a ranking system, third parties are given more of a chance at competing, able to represent unique issues to their supporters. Like anything in American politics, uprooting the status quo is difficult, but RCV has shown significant progress here. One can only wonder how the Know-Nothing party would have fared in an RCV system, perhaps able to retain some of its influence instead of being a casualty of the Civil War. However, what observers do know is that these third parties will continue to persist in American politics, potentially serving an even larger role in the future.

Sep

25

The Free Soil Party: Its Lasting Impact and Suggestions for American Reform

Filed Under From the Field, Minor Party Influence | Leave a Comment

Lydia Ring is a junior majoring in Politics, with concentration in American Politics, as well as Economics

 

This post is the third of this season of From the Field.  If you have not yet done so, please read this brief post by the series editor introducing our focus for the season.

In the years leading up to the American Civil War, slavery was one of the topics that drew the most attention in national politics. In his book, Liberty Power, Corey M. Brooks suggests that in advance of the 1848 presidential election, the two major parties (Whigs and Democrats) were having difficulty unifying on the issue of slavery and its expansion into the new territories (129). In response, the Free Soil Party was formed in 1848. The new minor party opposed the expansion of slavery. The Free Soil Party only existed for six years before it was absorbed into the newly forming Republican Party. Its agenda may have been too narrowly tailored with its sole focus on the issue of expanding slavery rather than the larger abolitionist cause, causing the party to lose relevance and support following the Compromise of 1850.

Despite the short existence of the Free Soil Party, it offers a valuable lens through which minor parties in America can be considered. An examination of the Free Soil Party reveals that this minor party had a significant impact on the larger political scene and suggests reform related to minor parties today. The Free Soil’s impact on the US party system can be seen in three major areas: its influence in making the issue of slavery important, the end of the Whig Party, and the formation of the Republican Party. Furthermore, a consideration of the Free Soil Party suggests ranked-choice voting as a helpful reform to help third parties today have long-term electoral success.

Regarding the influence of the Free Soil Party, this party first brought the expansion of slavery to the center of national politics, making it a national debate on which any party desiring to remain viable must take a stance. According to the Lawsons in their book, Race and Ethnicity in America, the unsuccessful yet well-known proposition of the Wilmot Proviso in 1946 suggested that the US should not allow slavery in any territories obtained from Mexico, which made the expansion of slavery a relevant debate (443). The Wilmot Proviso gave the Free Soil Party an opportunity to reorganize the party system around positions on slavery. The Free Soil Party took an emerging national debate and made it the defining issue of the time. The pressure imposed by the Free Soil Party in this way had great implications for the political system as a whole. For the existing major parties such as the Whig and Democratic Parties, there was division on this issue. The Free Soil Party’s creation placed existing parties under pressure in this area, leading to major shifts within the US party system as a whole.

Second, the Free Soil Party’s influence can be seen in the demise of the Whig Party following the 1852 election. When the Free Soil Party declared itself and its antislavery stance, natural party sorting occurred. Both Whigs and Democrats who were strongly antislavery abandoned their former party to join this new effort. According to Stephen Buck’s analysis of the national political scene in 1852, as the Free Soil Party gained momentum, the Whig Party “failed to grasp the importance of the slavery issue, instead continuing to focus on economic issues as the real problem” (48). While the Free Soil Party was tapping into the relevance of the slavery debate regarding US territories, the Whigs became increasingly irrelevant due to their inability to take a position on this important issue. The Free Soil Party’s push for debate on the issue of slavery highlighted divisions within the Whig Party on this topic and led to their eventual collapse. Many Southern Whigs joined the Democratic Party, while many Northern Whigs joined the antislavery forces in the North.

Third, the influence of the Free Soil Party is revealed in the unification of many Northern antislavery advocates in the newly forming Republican Party. While the Free Soil Party ceased operations in 1954, it was influential in helping the Republican Party establish itself using this issue of slavery. During the 1950s, the larger political system was characterized by confusion due to a lack of clarity among Whigs and Democrats on the issue of slavery. Buck also argues that “the problem of party identity began to clear during the 1854 campaign as the county Free-Soil Party declared its allegiance to the nascent Republican Party” (50). Now, with the endorsement of the Free Soil Party, the Republican Party could act as a place for antislavery advocates to unite. With this transition, the political system was completely transformed and America’s 3rd party system was created. Today, the Republican Party has evolved into one of the two major parties that dictate national politics.

To help minor parties today avoid the end that the Free Soil Party faced, ranked-choice voting emerges as a helpful reform. Many minor parties today are still struggling to gain sufficient momentum to hold seats in political offices and implement policies related to their platforms. Ranked-choice voting responds effectively to these issues without requiring an amendment to the Constitution or congressional law. When voters have the opportunity to rank candidates, it eliminates the idea of a wasted vote and encourages voters to give third-party candidates a chance. In the first empirical study examining ranked-choice voting, Gutierrez, Simmons, and Transue used survey research to evaluate the extent to which this voting system could boost electoral support for third-party candidates and found a strong relationship between ranked-choice voting and support for third-party candidates (374). The biggest concern with ranked-choice voting is that it has the potential to make political involvement even more confusing and demanding for the average American, which would discourage rather than encourage voter participation. While this reform would require an adjustment period to educate and assist Americans in this new system, the long-term value outweighs the short-term cost.

Promoting minor parties through reform is valuable because it will provide greater representation for political moderates who are currently dissatisfied with the two polarized extremes within the US political system. As explained by a political theory known as DuVerger’s Law, America’s use of single-member districts with plurality elections is expected to produce a two-party system. Research by Morris Fiorina in Unstable Majorities indicates that a polarized two-party system is not helpful because the average American is not as politically extreme as those who are highly involved in politics. This disparity leads to ineffective representation of the vast majority of the American public. Increasing the success of minor parties within the American system will allow for a more effective representation of America’s diverse population.

The Free Soil Party provides a valuable lens for evaluating minor parties in America. While the party was influential in shaping political transitions during the 1840s and 1850s that had enduring impacts, its ultimate failure to become an enduring organization suggests the need for institutional reform. The recommendation of ranked-choice voting offers an opportunity to strengthen minor parties and, through this growth, promote better representation for the average American in today’s party system. While the two-party system is deeply rooted in American politics, change is not impossible. Institutional reform in the form of ranked-choice voting is a promising option for the future success of minor parties and addresses key issues within today’s two-party system.

Sep

9

Minor Party Influence: How The American Independent Party Transformed the Political System

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Braden Glenny is a sophomore Politics major pursuing a concentration in American Politics

This post is the second of this season of From the Field.  If you have not yet done so, please read this brief post by the series editor introducing our focus for the season.

Throughout American history, many minor political parties have risen for specific reasons and failed to gain large amounts of traction in the long term. One such party is the American Independent Party, a far-right political party founded in 1967. It reached its peak in 1968, with the nomination of Alabama Governor George Wallace for president as a more conservative alternative to the two main parties. The American Independent Party successfully pushed the much larger Republican Party further to the right. It, along with other minor parties in the United States, could potentially gain more prominence if changes occur to the election process, such as implementing multi-member districts and loosening requirements for ballot access.

The creation of the American Independent Party was the direct result of dissatisfaction among primarily members of the Democratic Party. Many conservative Democrats felt disillusioned with what they viewed as an increasing “hostility of the national party’s policies toward the interests of their region” (30). The supporters of the American Independent Party viewed efforts by the federal government to enforce desegregation as an unconstitutional action against the rights of the states. The official American Independent Party platform from 1968 claims that the federal government was violating the Tenth Amendment by taking control over “rights and privileges of the individual citizen, which are properly subject to state or local control, as distinguished from federal control”. Along with this key issue, the American Independent Party had a platform which could be broadly categorized as socially conservative, economically populist and anti-elitist (30). This platform provided a broader sense of appeal, which helped the party expand its base.

The American Independent Party was the most successful during the 1968 presidential election, which it greatly influenced. In 1968, the party nominated Governor George C. Wallace, a Democrat from Alabama, for President. Wallace had previously run as a Democrat in 1964, competing in primaries against incumbent Lyndon B. Johnson in “Wisconsin, Indiana, and Maryland—and surprised political observers by winning between 30 percent and 43 percent of the popular vote in these contests” (8). Such a performance seemingly proved that Wallace’s platform had popular support nationwide. There was a serious concern that Wallace could deadlock the Electoral College and use that as leverage against the two main parties in hopes of receiving concessions. In the end, he received 13.53 percent of the popular vote and carried five states worth 45 electoral votes in total (31). Wallace still remains the most recent third party candidate to win state votes in the Electoral College.

Wallace would return to the Democratic Party in 1972 and the AIP would attempt to go on without his candidacy to elevate them. However, they would only receive 1.4% of the popular vote in the 1972 election (9). The party had a major schism in 1976, splitting their already minuscule vote total (31). Today, only the California affiliate of the American Independent Party remains operational, where they play “an active role in state politics”. They continue to influence elections in California primarily by endorsing candidates running as part of the much larger Republican Party (Endorsements). Although the party remains active in this form, it has zero presence on the national stage. How has the AIP influenced the system, if it has accomplished little electorally?

The AIP played a major part in the American political scene by helping jump-start the so-called “Southern Strategy” and shift the Republican Party in a more conservative direction. Prior to the 1960s, the American South was solidly Democratic at every level of government. However, the Democratic Party nationally would begin to become more liberal. The AIP in 1968 gave many formerly hardline Democrats an opportunity to consider the potential of an alternative party. Nixon would adopt many tennets of Wallace’s 1968 campaign, such as support for law enforcement. This action would lead many white working-class voters in the South to defect to the Republican side, pushing the party further to the right. Since then, the South has been a major point of focus with how campaigns conduct themselves rhetorically. The AIP had successfully taught both parties that you cannot ignore the interests of the South (31). The desire for a third electorally viable party in the United States is nothing new. However, as explained previously, this momentum is not permanent. Why could there not be a third major party under normal circumstances? What can be done to make minor parties more viable?

The United States has been dominated by a two-party system since the 1820s. One common explanation often utilized by scholars is that this is due to what is known as Duverger’s law. To simplify, Duverger’s law essentially states that single-member districts with a first-past-the-post voting system are more likely to result in two-party systems. Some reformers suggest that if US states were to adopt some form of proportionally represented multi-member district for legislative seats, the two-party system weaken. However, it is currently illegal for states to apportion their congressional seats in a multi-member fashion. An act of Congress repealing the law in place would be a necessity. Multi-member districts, particularly statewide ones, may be in violation of the Voting Rights Act if there is a significant minority population. Additionally, ten states already utilize some form of multi-member district for their state legislatures (2013). Despite this, nearly all of these state legislative seats are controlled by the two main parties (2013). Therefore, it is debatable whether multi-member districts make much difference by themselves.

In addition to implementing multi-member districts, changing laws restricting ballot access could also benefit minor parties. Many state election laws are often tailored specifically to hurt these less prominent parties. For example, to appear on the ballot in Pennsylvania, an independent or minor party candidate must obtain a number of signatures equivalent to two percent of voters in the highest turnout election for the office being sought after (Ballot access requirements for political candidates in Pennsylvania), which often adds up to a much higher total than the number required from “ballot qualified” parties. In addition to having to meet extensive signature requirements, candidates must pay a filing fee, which is much easier for Democratic or Republican candidates to afford due to having access to far more resources. Such laws often make it near impossible for independent or minor party candidates to appear on the ballot and changing them would give minor parties a fairer chance.

The American Independent Party is an American far-right party founded in 1967 due to the dissatisfaction of conservative southern Democrats with the state of national politics. It performed well in the 1968 presidential election due to the name recognition provided by Alabama governor George C. Wallace. However, after he returned to the Democratic Party, the AIP began to fall apart. The AIP successfully pushed the greater Republican Party further to the right and brought the desired attention to southern interests. While the two-party system has existed in the United States for centuries, certain reforms such as implementing multi-member districts and loosening ballot access requirements can help boost minor parties. Additionally, even if they do not directly win elections, minor parties can have a major impact on the American political landscape, just as the American Independent Party did.

 

Sep

9

Minor Parties and Their Outsized Influence

Filed Under From the Field, Minor Party Influence | Leave a Comment

Dr. Robin Lauermann, professor of politics, edits this series

This post is the first of this season – our sixth – of From the Field.  If you have not yet done so, read our introduction to the seriesWelcome and Introduction to From the Field.

In the spring of 2020, we launched the From the Field series with a set of analyses on the American party system. A durable feature of the system has been its centering around two parties since 1800, when party labels first appeared on the ballot, except for a short, aptly named “Era of Good Feelings” in the early 1800s. Since the 1860s, the Democrats and Republicans have formed a sort of “duopoly” though the substance of their respective platforms and their voter coalitions have varied dramatically over time. Among other factors, the primacy of winner-take-all elections — in the form of single-member plurality and single-member majority contests — has discouraged the ability of minor parties to compete. As a result, a narrative has developed that minor parties do not matter if they cannot compete and win seats. This past spring, students in the Parties and Elections found that this narrative is not especially accurate.

Examining select parties throughout political history, they uncovered a rich web of effects on the party system and the resulting policies produced by it. As we pulled together findings from across their projects, we saw repeatedly that minor parties were more than election “spoilers”. Minor party presence and electoral support offer at minimum what political scientists term a “safety valve” for portions of the public that felt unrepresented by the existing choices. Even more importantly, their activity prodded the main parties to bring issues into their agendas, resulting in policies that seemed unlikely before the third parties mustered their efforts. In short, even when third parties do not win office – not to mention sizeable minorities or majorities – they still matter. (Note: research on these parties intends to contribute to our knowledge and does not serve as an endorsement for any party or their issue stances.)

Not dismissing the challenges of third parties to compete, students also delved into potential reforms and their limitations. Some reforms, such as ranked-choice voting, require only changes in law and can occur within our existing constitutional system. Others are improbable without constitutional amendments and related changes to our presidential system of government. These analyses show the important considerations – and most often the tradeoffs – that make reforms a slow process.

Several students have distilled their academic research essays into blog posts to share with you, complete with relevant sources for you to pursue further if you wish. Equipped with this knowledge, voters can make more informed decisions.

 

Read on for the first post in this new season…

May

17

For Times Such as This: There IS Hope!

Filed Under For Times Such as This -- Unstable Majorities, From the Field | Leave a Comment

Gabriella Kovalchick is a rising senior, majoring in Politics and International Relations with an American Politics Concentration

This post is the final one of this season of From the Field.  If you have not yet done so, read this brief post introducing Unstable Majorities, which includes not only a background on the book but also some amazingly helpful resources.

For our final book in the Politics Seminar, the subject moved towards a growing problem in the United States political scene. In Morris Fiorina’s Unstable Majorities: Polarization, Party Sorting & Political Stalemate, Fiorina addresses the growing phenomena of polarization looking at U.S. history, other countries, and the 2016 presidential election. Taking time to lay foundational knowledge, this book was similar to our previous book in that it was accessible to individuals in and outside the field of politics. In response to this book and our discussions in class, while I often am pessimistic about our current political climate, I was ultimately convinced that there is hope for our system because we are resilient.

There are many dilemmas discussed in Unstable Majorites, but a primary one illustrated in the text is the overreach of political parties. Fiorina provides a simple definition stating, “By overreach, I mean simply that after it wins control of an elected institution, particularly when it wins control of all three elected institutions, a party attempts to govern in a manner that alienates the marginal members of its electoral majority” (93). Leading up to overreach, we are seeing a growing population of independents. Our current political parties are not representing the public, leading to party bases that encompass more extreme ideologies, and independent voters swinging between parties. This large population of independents primarily interacts with important elections, leaving the base supporters interacting with the rest, continuing the dilemma of parties not representing the people. However, in light of this book and class discussions, this dilemma is known, so it is just a matter of how we address it.

A key point I have taken away from Fiorina’s Unstable Majorities is the impact civic knowledge or lack thereof, has on our current system. Underlying many issues illustrated in this text is whether people know how to interact with the government. In the case of the growing population of independents, campaigns are shifting to target hot topics that sway independents (Chapter 6). People do not necessarily know how to respond to this tactic we have seen with overreach, many of these hot topics are not addressed while individuals are in office, so people need to learn how to look beyond the loud parts of politics. These findings underscore the importance of civic education, which has been a recurring theme in the course.

Although not a point with which I explicitly disagree, Fiorina surprised me by asserting that Trump could have a positive role in change. He suggested, “…Trump might play a positive role as a de-sorter, someone with the potential to disrupt the sorted parties that underlie much of our current political discontent and possibly even begin the construction of a new electoral coalition” (219). It is hard to look at politicians, especially Trump, as a figure of positive change in our political system. However, I can say that he has pointed out many flaws in our system, causing more individuals to call for positive change.

As I mentioned earlier, I always found myself being very pessimistic thinking about the current state of American politics. However, in light of class discussions, I think Fiorina has illustrated with historical comparisons that what we are dealing with is not new (Chapter 9). I have grown to see that we are resilient in working through these times of unstable majorities, and with more public outcry, there are more chances for change. What good does it do to not be hopeful? Even if the government does not explicitly care for the population, people are working every day to bring about justice and change. As an individual, I can continue to advocate for education in the hope that people will gain more hope in our system. It may be complicated, but there is hope that things will get better instead of only worse.

May

10

For Times Such as This: America, Divided or Disconnected?

Filed Under For Times Such as This -- Unstable Majorities, From the Field | Leave a Comment

Jackson Hazen is a senior studying politics & international relations, as well as Spanish.

 

This post is the sixteenth of this season of From the Field.  If you have not yet done so, read this brief post introducing Unstable Majorities, which includes not only a background on the book but also some amazingly helpful resources.

America today is more divided than ever before in our history, at least that is what many politicians, reporters, and even members of the public would say when asked about the state of American politics. But despite our common assumptions and what we are told in our headlines, how divided are we really? Morris Fiorina argues in Unstable Majorities that the American electorate is not any more divided now than we were 20, 40, or even 100 years ago. Fiorina outlines how party sorting has resulted in a large portion of the electorate faced with choosing between two parties that nominate and run practically identical candidates year after year. The result is an America that seems divided because of the dramatically sorted parties, when in actuality there remains a large portion of the population that lies not on either end of the political spectrum, but clustered around the middle. Although not quite reaching as far to offer solutions, Fiorina does a good job of calming a panicked electorate with his critical yet unbiased approach, allowing civility to reign over tribalism.

To confront assumptions about a divided electorate Fiorina focuses on the rise in the number of voters who self-report as independents. This view directly contrasts with the most common assumptions about American politics, which is that voters have been running towards either end of the extremes of either party, increasing the number of people who identify as either Republican or Democrat. Fiorina points out, “…it is partisans, not independents, who have lost ground: independents are now the largest single ‘partisan’ category” (25). This finding is a key takeaway from the book because it reinforces Fiorina’s point that Americans are not as divided as one might think. As elections have passed the number of independents has not fallen, if anything the number of voters registering as “decline to state” (DtS) or another term for independent has risen. This shift is seen in states with party registration, where DtS registration rose from 12 to 18 percent between 1976 and 2008 (25). Fiorina makes it clear that, if independents are growing and make up a plurality of registered voters, then America is not becoming more divided than before.

Despite the pragmatic outlook Fiorina provides, he does little in the way of offering solutions to the growing resentment directed towards elites, the media, and the system. Addressing the often-inaccurate characterization of those who voted for Trump in 2016, Fiorina points out the growing frustration with the nation’s elites that is prevalent in both the Republican and Democrat camps (218). Many are cold to traditional media and its straying from objectivity, and even more believe that the system itself is to blame, but Fiorina does not offer suggestions for what political scientists can do to solve these problems. By closing with, “For now, at least, an era of unstable majorities continues” (223), Fiorina paints a bleaker picture of American democracy that seems to be headed in the same direction as it has been for the past 15 years.

The perceived polarization of American politics has destroyed civil discourse, but Fiorina explains why this view is mistaken. In the aftermath of the 2016 election, many pundits and journalists made sweeping generalizations and statements that sought to portray the election as proof that a large portion of Americans were racist, sexist, or xenophobic. However, Fiorina takes a more calculated and realistic approach, he clarifies that voters more likely were responding to the economic and social conditions of the time, much like in other periods of divided government in U.S. history (163-166). Trump’s election was a continuation of the status quo of 2012, Fiorina states, “…in a majoritarian system like ours, small change in the vote can have enormous consequences for party control of our governing institutions and the policies they produce” (172). Trump being elected in 2016 was likely the result of small shifts in the electorate and not an underlying racist or sexist American populace. To be sure, criticisms of Trump and the way he ran his campaign are fair, but Fiorina makes sure to quell generalizations of the electorate that do more harm than good to our political system.

Unstable Majorities provides a fresh outlook on a system that we often misjudge or mischaracterize as deeply polarized. By allowing readers to see the political landscape for what it is rather than what we perceive it to be, Fiorina allows us to look past destructive tribalism and recognize that we are not as divided as we may seem. American politics is not headed for disaster like so many like to forecast, the system is resilient and has made it through tough times before. While Fiorina does not offer solutions, he paves the path for readers to do so. By understanding our similarities, and how they cut across our perceived differences, we can help guide the course of American politics. What happens in the next five or ten years is up to our response to the system – our willingness to collaborate and communicate – that is the way forward for American politics. It all starts with the understanding that America is not divided but disconnected.

May

2

For Times Such as This: It’s Been Worse! Reviewing Morris P. Fiorina’s Unstable Majorities

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Allie Mast is a newly-minted alumna of politics and international relations, with an American politics concentration and a minor in English. She will be attending the University at Buffalo School of Law in the fall

This post is the fifteenth of this season of From the Field.  If you have not yet done so, read this brief post introducing Unstable Majorities, which includes not only a background on the book but also some amazingly helpful resources.

With whose voice is public opinion spoken? In Unstable Majorities: Polarization, Party Sorting & Political Stalemate, Morris P. Fiorina reveals the dyadic nature of American public opinion—splitting not along party lines, but between the political elite and ordinary citizens. In a robust analysis with statistical and historical evidence, Fiorina challenges our understanding of polarization and provides a sliver of optimism about the state of our politics: perhaps we are not as divided as we are led to believe. However, the absence of historical evidence in his concluding hypothesis regarding (now former) President Donald Trump, limits the credibility of this particular prediction.

Commonplace are the claims that the American people are polarized to an unprecedented degree. Fiorina contests such a notion, arguing instead that America itself has not changed, and that the ordinary American has not changed either. In fact, the ways that ordinary citizens think about policy issues ranging from poverty to business to religion to foreign affairs are largely the same today as they were in 1987 (29). If we turn the clock back to the 1970s and 1980s, we might find familiar battles. For example, we see threads of President Reagan’s crusade against the Warren and Burger courts in today’s landscape, namely with the overturning of Roe v. Wade and Grutter v. Bollinger. We may also trace President Nixon’s efforts to unshackle the police to the Black Lives Matter and Blue Lives Matter movements of 2020. Although 2023 voters are faced with wildly different candidates than in the 1970s and 1980s, Fiorina reports that “in the aggregate, the public today looks much the same as the one that chose between Gerald Ford and Jimmy Carter in 1976” (29). By realizing that ordinary citizens have remained relatively similar in their reasons for division and the extent to which they divide, Fiorina lessens the sense of doom that we may feel about the state of our polarization.

Additionally, Fiorina challenges claims which compare America’s current polarization to
the polarization of the Civil War era, citing the sentiments of radio talk show host Dennis Prager.
Prager warns that:

It is time for our society to acknowledge a sad truth: America is currently fighting its
second Civil War. In fact, with the obvious and enormous exception of attitudes toward
slavery, Americans are more divided morally, ideologically[,] and politically today than
they were during the Civil War (17).

This author has long felt that such claims lack perspicacity, for how they appear to be rooted in history but are actually divorced from a historical context. Fiorina effectively addresses two problematic aspects of the above excerpt, first that “Americans are divided.” What Americans are divided? There may be truth to Prager’s warning if the Americans he speaks of are the political elites—elected officials and candidates, donors, party and issue activists (21). However, if “Americans” are understood to be the electorate, or what Fiorina calls “normal people,” the data clearly suggests that Americans are not deeply polarized (30). Furthermore, Fiorina addresses the claim that America is “currently fighting its second Civil War.” If the division we are facing today is of a civil war level, then surely this cannot be only our second. As Fiorina explains the falsity of Prager’s claim, he demonstrates the difference between a claim grounded in historical context, and one that merely refers to history.

Fiorina consistently provides statistical and historical evidence to back his assertions, rendering the instance where he fails to do so all the more stark. In the final chapter, Fiorina comments that President Trump might play a positive role as “someone with the potential to disrupt the sorted parties that underlie much of our political discontent and possibly even begin the construction of a new electoral coalition” (219). Fiorina also describes Trump as one who might drive a wedge through the factions of the Republican, and potentially even Democratic, parties (219). To an informed student observer, Fiorina’s prediction is logical. However, one is left to wonder whether there is a precedent for a candidate producing such disruption, especially since, by the end of the book, readers have almost been conditioned to expect a historical or statistical basis for his assertions. Furthermore, there lies a body of research on factions and their longevity, that is to say that Fiorinia’s hypothesis is not in uncharted waters. Even so, if Trump’s disruption of the parties would, indeed, be without precedent, then Fiorina fails to acknowledge the tentativeness of his remarks. Albeit a minor observation among a sea of fully supported claims, to close with a relatively unsubstantiated prediction weakens the credibility of his closing remarks.

Perhaps the problem with America’s political elite is not that they are polarized, but that they are ignorant—ignorant to the degree that the American electorate is polarized, ignorant to the real culprits of polarization, and ignorant to the extent of racial, ethnic, and labor violence in this country’s history. As a civics and history lesson might reveal, the disagreement and disorder that characterizes politics today is not historically unique, and furthermore, they are of a lower order of intensity compared to the conflicts of the mid-twentieth century (217). If William Neuman suggests that “things are never so bad that they can’t get worse”, then Fiorina offers that “it’s been worse!” Fiorina’s Unstable Majorities is not merely a call for hope, but a call for historical perspective and highsight. Whether partisan or independent, an engaged or passive observer, we must question the claims of politicos and pundits as they spout about public opinion, asking if their assertions are rooted in an accurate perception of the electorate and placed in the context of American history.

Apr

18

For Times Such as This: The Great Conversation?

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Kyle Chu is a senior politics and international relations major (American politics concentration), with minors in music and statistics.

This post is the fourteenth of this season of From the Field.  If you have not yet done so, read this brief post introducing Unstable Majorities, which includes not only a background on the book, but also some amazingly helpful resources.

 

Conversations are the lifeblood of community. A community comprised of good listeners, wise discerners, and neighborly responders will be able to face the problems of its time, growing stronger as a result. On the other hand, when a community’s members put up psychological walls against the voices of differing views and begin to shout their own views without discernment, the problems of the community grow stronger while the community itself languishes. Is America a conversationalist nation? That is, does America’s political infrastructure allow the voices of every group in the U.S. to be heard and effective? Morris Fiorina, in his Unstable Majorities, answers in the negative: America’s two parties have sorted, leading to issue and affective polarization that hamper bipartisan deliberation. Moreover, a glaring discontinuity exists between the respective agendas of the two parties and the desires of the American electorate. Unfortunately, Fiorina leaves his readers without any substantive solutions to these crises.

First, the Democratic and Republican parties have sorted, meaning that both parties have become ideologically homogeneous (i.e. only liberal Democrats and only conservative Republicans) (47). Sorting has produced partisan polarization in both the policy arena and in the emotional arena (i.e. affective polarization). Regarding partisan polarization surrounding policy, abortion is a good example. According to the General Social Survey, before 1992, Democrats and Republicans did not diverge significantly concerning the average number of circumstances in which they thought “it possible for a pregnant woman to obtain a legal abortion.” (50) However, by 2014, the averaged difference grew to 2 circumstances, with Democrats favoring more circumstances than the Republicans (52). Regarding affective polarization, Fiorina quotes Iyengar, Sood, and Lelkes: “Democrats and Republicans not only increasingly dislike the opposing party, but also impute negative traits to the rank-and-file of the out-party…affective polarization…exceeds polarization based on other social cleavages…” (60) Thus, the two parties have created a zero-sum scenario: partisans, particularly the partisan leadership, tend to live, move, and have their being with people of the same mind, voice, and disdain for the other party (49, 62), and such partisans see the other party as an uncompromisable threat. Accordingly, bipartisan conversation suffers.

Second, discontinuities exist between the party leadership and the broader electorate. As Figure 2.6 on page 24 portrays, three surveys, the ANES, the NY Times/CBS News, and the General Social Survey, all show that Americans, in contrast with the party sorting and polarization of the political class, have remained ideological centrists for at least the past 4 decades. The growing asymmetry between the political class and the broader electorate invariably has led to an asymmetry between party platforms and the desires of the populace and to the burgeoning of the “independent” partisan category (25, 99, 105). Fiorina condenses this complex relationship with the concept of party overreach: because of the close party divide, each party must win a majority of independents in order to win majorities in government (93). Accordingly, during elections, the parties “soften some of their core positions and downplay some of the issues of most concern to their base supporters.” (91) However, after elections, parties focus on the agendas of their respective bases, which alienate the marginal supporters (91, 105). For example, President Obama focused on core issues of the Democratic base during his presidency, such as climate change, gun control, and immigration, even though the broader electorate was concerned much more about the economy, jobs, and terrorism (101-102). Such discontinuities indicate a failure in conversation between the party system and the electorate.

Unfortunately, Fiorina leaves the reader with this pessimistic outlook of the American political infrastructure without proposing any substantive solutions. He does suggest the possibility of Donald Trump catalyzing a party realignment:

Trump might play a positive role as a de-sorter, someone with the potential to disrupt the sorted parties that underlie much of our current political discontent and possibly even begin the construction of a new electoral coalition. By taking positions on trade, entitlements, and foreign policy that violate Republican orthodoxy, Trump might drive a wedge between Republican factions. By supporting a big infrastructure program he might drive a wedge between gentry liberals and the blue-collar factions of the Democrats (219). However, bleak indeed the American situation must be if political scientists are placing any considerable stock of hope in Donald Trump, a man who is not unfamiliar with unevidenced invective, hyperbolic name-calling, and alienating propaganda in remedying the demise of political conversation and deliberation in America. In other words, Fiorina critiques the plight of American politics with nuance and perspicacity; however, he stops there, ending his book like a critic with no feet.

In Unstable Majorities, Morris Fiorina effectively unveils the failure of American party politics in facilitating crosscutting conversations across the American populace, especially between the political class and the “ordinary” citizen. Party sorting has intensified partisan polarization pertaining to both issues and emotion, and the two parties no longer represent with reasonable accuracy the desires of the American electorate. Unfortunately, Fiorina leaves us remediless in restoring the American conversation. We must seek out the solution to U.S. polarization and the breakdown of representation. Otherwise, our problems will only grow, and we will only grow weaker.

Apr

18

For Times Such as This: Unstable Majorities Gives New Meaning to Political Polarization

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Dr. Robin Lauermann, professor of politics, edits this series

This post is the thirteenth of our new season, For Times Such as This.  If you have not yet done so, please read this season-opening post for some brief context. 

It seems impossible to turn on the news or talk about the political climate without the issue of red versus blue parties, officials and citizens arising.  Unlike the more pessimistic perspective of our prior course read – Things Are Never So Bad That They Can’t Get Worse – the author of the final book of our capstone this year offers us important insight for constructive change.  Dr. Morris Fiorina of Stanford University and its Hoover Institution is among the most renowned scholars of the political behavior of voters and members of Congress. His knack is not only brilliant insight about the developments in these areas, but also his willingness and ability to write for a general audience.

(We are fortunate to welcome him this coming fall for our annual American Democracy Lecture – more details will follow, but please save the date for Monday October 28, 2024!)

In his 2017 Unstable Majorities: Polarization, Party Sorting and Political Stalemate, Dr. Fiorina offers a clear and compelling alternative account for polarization within contemporary American politics.  Amid gridlock, acrimony and widely fluctuating policies (when passage can occur),  the idea of polarization is front and center in our system.  However, as we shall read in the analyses ahead, the causes are not what common thought would have us believe.  As a result, realistic opportunities exist to work towards an improved political climate.

If you are motivated by the video summary above and analyses that follow, a number of excellent, practical resources exist.  Here are just a few:

As capstone closed at the end of the semester, students worked in groups to apply the lessons from Fiorina t0 problem-solving reforms.  They left encouraged – and I hope you will too!  These students also participated in an amazing panel at Messiah’s Humanities Symposium in late February. Read on for the first analysis in this segment!