Isabella Farrington graduated this past spring as a politics and international relations major with an American politics concentration and a minor in studio art.

 

This post is the third of this season of From the Field.  If you have not yet done so, please read this brief post by the series editor introducing our focus for the season.

The episode “What Deliberative Democracy Can, and Can’t, Do” from the podcast The Gray Area with Seal Illing features political scientist Jane Mansbridge on addressing problems within civic engagement with deliberative democracy. They speak to the history of the US political atmosphere, and what polarization, civic engagement, and partisanship actually looks like, highlighting party sorting, mass media, and affluent voices as the main drivers of polarization and an uninformed public. In response, Mansbridge argues that deliberative democracy is a method of civic engagement that cultivates informed citizens and representatives to encourage good decision-making, while navigating the problems of the political systems and natural human tendencies. The benefits and limits of deliberative democracy are intricately connected to many important aspects of public opinion, including how informed the public is, the structure of political communication in the modern age, and psychological and epistemological factors of being human. Based on these concepts and Mansbridge and Illings’ conversation, deliberative democracy provides an opportunity to mitigate problems of reactionary and structural tendencies within the political system towards a more representative and intentional decision-making atmosphere, especially in the face of party sorting.

To start, drawing on arguments from Morris Fiorina, Mansbridge recites how political parties have become more “homogenous” on the elite level (as independents have moved to one party or the other), and also further apart on the ideological scale (Illing 2019, 3:50; Glynn et al. 2015, 265). In many ways, this party sorting makes it harder for representatives to compromise as opinions on issues are farther apart.  Further, when parties are not only less ideologically moderate, but political systems encourage competition, communication and actions on issues become more entertainment or persuasion-based, rather than constructive. Mansbridge explains how increased competition, because of increased elite polarization, incentivizes parties to “win” rather than collaborate. In other words, competition “pays each party to destroy the other” (Illing 2019, 9:50). Decreased tolerance of dissenting views, as exemplified by strong partisan public figures and representatives, interferes with the system’s ability to serve the citizenry’s legitimate interests (Glynn et al. 2015, 266). In part, increased political competition is shown through mass media developments.

Historically and today, modern mass media has intensified political debate to sensationalism, biased coverage, and even libelous attacks on the opposition, often driven by monetary incentives (Glynn et al. 2015, 332). While there is the concern that media in this form could diminish political tolerance for dissenting views within the elite and the public, the true extent of this impact is somewhat limited (333). Mansbridge and Illing discuss media in the context of nationalizing and globalizing awareness of politics and issues (Illing 2019, 15:00). They contemplate how increased access to information is both valuable to awareness and greatly influenced by bias and consumerist culture. That is, media and politics, have become products for citizens to consume and react to, not to interpret and evaluate (16:00). Social media is named here as especially polarizing, due to its algorithmic mechanisms (17:30; 43:30). Not to mention that general trend that media outlets do not have important statistical literacy for presenting public opinion and poll results (Asher 2017, 168). While deliberative democracy offers some ways to curb media influence, still more relevant to public opinion than media is party identification, in light of party sorting and affluent voices.

As party identification is the number one indicator of voting habits (Glynn et al. 2015, 245), party sorting poses concerns for deliberative democracy regarding collaboration and representation of voices. Research shows that more partisan Americans make use their voices more in every stage of the political process (266). Throughout the episode, Mansbridge references various similar distinctions that contribute to which citizens voices are louder than others, including partisanship, wealth, and education (Illing 2019, 11:45). These distinctions are commonly known to outline the knowledge gap: those who are more affluent have greater access to information, pay more attention, or learn more, increasing their likelihood of being active in the political sphere (Glynn et al. 2015, 341). Thus, most of the voices represented are not usually ordinary citizens, but those with greater resources for political engagement and those who are more partisan. In the same way that public opinion polls that do not have a representational sample are skewed, inaccurate, or limited in their conclusions (Asher 2017, 280), Congress members often misrepresent their constituents’ interests because they are only hearing the activist voices (Illing 27:30). The issue then becomes not only an uninformed public, but also uninformed representatives.

Deliberative democracy provides intentional practices and mechanisms for addressing the side effects of party sorting, mass media, and an uninformed public and Congress. Mansbridge utilizes the example of the “mini publics” practice, where randomized groups of citizens are brought together to speak about issues with representatives, but are given information and the intentional structure to discuss (Illing 2019, 29:45). A broader term to use would be deliberative opinion polls. Deliberative opinion polls, mini publics, and other similar practices measure what the public thinks when they have the opportunity to be informed on issues through discussion and study (45:45; Asher 2017, 201). Again, ensuring a sample is randomized prevents skewed results towards those who are more affluent and activist in the political sphere. To this effect, deliberative democracy practices bring ordinary citizens into the conversation, better informing representatives on the interests of their constituents (25:30; 34:45). Channels of communication are created between the stakeholders and the decision-makers, the citizens and the representatives.

Deliberative democracy also offers the opportunity to bridge partisan divides and mitigate emotional responses. An interesting statistic brought up in the podcast expresses that the percent of people who would be uncomfortable with their child marrying someone not of the same political party has increased from 5% to 70% (19:00). In other words, the social emotionality of political evaluation has greatly increased, as people have become more concerned with what others think and will accept, in relation to political views and tolerance (Glynn et al. 2015, 133). Naturally, people are both emotional and reactive, and yet rational. Psychological tendencies, including perception errors, emotions, and socialization, greatly influence the lens through which people engage and respond to politics (177-199). These tendencies are more inclined towards symbolic politics, seen through the increase of candidate-centered campaigns (363, 385). Deliberative democracy, because of its intentional format towards not only amplifying voices, but also equipping them, works to go beyond surface-level reactions towards better decision-making.

Deliberative democracy may also have long-term trickle-down effects. For instance, Mansbridge suggests that representatives be trained in negotiation (25:30). By doing so, not only would representatives be more able to accomplish their goals and gain a majority, but also would model bipartisanship and, possibly, decrease elite polarization. In a similar fashion, if media outlets were equipped with adequate poll literacy for reporting public opinion accurately and disincentivizing horse-race characterization of election reporting (Asher 2017, 193, 260). Presenting information in ways that encourage deliberate evaluation and opportunities for deliberate opinion formation may make such practices more present in education and social life, making regular people more prepared to participate in deliberative democracy (37). In other words, civic responsibility and civic education begin to integrate into day-to-day life by the methods of deliberative democracy.

Mansbridge argues that while there is an enmeshment of identity with politics and needs that stimulates partisan thinking, representatives are still looking to “get things done” for their constituents (Illing 2019, 21:00). Moreover, citizens want to engage with the issues they care about in deliberative processes (34:45). The trick is balancing the modern-day problems of a weighty policyscape, issue field, and increasingly bigger political world against the side effects of party sorting, media, and natural human tendencies. What is especially wise about Mansbridge’s argument is her acknowledgment that the more you require of people the more unrepresentative a sample will be, as you will only attract the activist, affluent voices (44:30). In fact, she argues that people do not always need to be deeply engaged or knowledgeable about politics all the time – that is part of the reason we have representatives (34). Instead, improving how communication between constituents and representatives can have important long-term effect in cultivating deliberative thinking in the public and in representatives (41). By implementing simple practices that engage more stakeholders in more constructive ways, deliberative democracy can work to channel our natural interests towards representative, informed decision making.

References

Glynn, Carroll J., Susan Herbst, Mark Lindeman, Garrett J. O’Keefe, and Robert Y. Shapiro. 2018. Public Opinion. Routledge.

Liz Donofry is a junior majoring in Studio Art

This post is the second of this season of From the Field.  If you have not yet done so, please read this brief post by the series editor introducing our focus for the season.

This episode of The Gray Area features Harvard professor of political science Jane Mansbridge, who was previously the president of the American Political Science Association, and co-editor of the book, Deliberative Systems: Deliberative Democracy at the Large Scale. Given her extensive background within the field, the episode is an interview framed around themes of deliberative democracy as a cultural orientation toward more reasoned public discourse. The dynamic between Mansbridge, being a full proponent of deliberative democracy, and the host, being a skeptic, was unexpected to me, and listening to the episode made me wrestle, question, and contemplate my stance on the issue, pulling from information that I have only freshly learned during my time in Polling and Public Opinion. Between the course and the podcast episode, there were correlating themes, such as media influence on nationalism,
polarizations between citizens and political elites, and the vitality of interpersonal communication and public competence in upholding sovereignty for the future. Below, I analyze each of the themes and evaluate the episode as a retrospective of the course.

In the episode, there was a disagreement that anchored the tone of the conversation and led me to wonder what the driving forces of polarization are. The host proposed that social communication and media influence on the public causes nationalization, which in turn causes polarization (16:09). Jane Mansbridge countered, saying the linkage between each is not strongly related and there is a difference between the linear progression of nationalization and the u-curve of polarization. She also expressed that although the media is polarizing, it does not secure a link between nationalism and political polarization. Mansbridge raises the point that President FDR’s fireside chats utilized media in the form of a radio broadcast, which brought the nation together (17:14). His actions are no small feat, as the country adored a new kind of bridge between political elites and the public – and, I think, was a successful way for technology to be put to good use. Using the tools available to increase communication and political literacy in the public is a tactic Mansbridge mentions later in the episode, and how it should be practiced more in the future for encouraging a conversive society between parties, constituents, and levels of government (42:30). This association reminded me of our discussion of measuring the role of the public and policy through certain schemas and lenses. In class, we learn that Congress is best represented ideologically in a U-curve and the public, in a bell curve (April 17, 2025, Lecture, Polling and Public Opinion). Both are examples of polarization and present challenges in finding common ground, as the public falls within the middle, moderate range, but Congress is more divided between extremes.

However, in recent years, since FDR’s fireside chats, there has been a steady rise in direct communication between political candidates and the public through social media platforms
such as X and even TikTok. Barberá and Steinert-Threlkeld (2020, 711) comment on the growing number of political leaders who actively use social media and note how the increase has allowed politicians to promote themselves without relying on traditional journalism or news, thereby fostering a sense of accessibility and connection with average citizens. While this link can enhance the perception of equality between political elites and the public, it does not necessarily translate into greater structural equality or influence over policy outcomes. So, while political communication with the media has been a proponent of nationalism and polarization, one cannot attribute their interrelatedness.

Thinking normatively about equality and the use of media as a means of providing a level voice to both politicians and the public, the humanity and identity relationship that is found in the public is also found in politicians. Mansbridge stresses that political leaders are humans too, and not just partisans (23:30). Although the internet and social media have somewhat “leveled the playing field”, empirically, there is still polarization in media, as people living in cities versus rural communities have felt differently about the idea of the media and their involvement in policy. People moving to a city from a more rural place experienced more isolation, and the shift in alignment with rural communities to “the public,” and people in a city behave as “the masses” (Glynn et al. 2015, 342-343). The delineation between “masses” being held less convicted and having a lower sense of personal responsibility than the public is one we learned about early on when discussing popular sovereignty – rooting the legitimacy of government in the consent of the people.

The idea of deliberative democracy and popular sovereignty pair well together concerning the amount of responsibility that one feels for the outcome of the government’s decisions. If we are to humanize the politicians as Mansbridge is encouraging us to do, then we can see the need for each citizen to be aware of their actions and opinions, and see the power they hold (Tocqueville 2010, 91-97). Contemplating that idea compels us to examine how many young people are empowered to become political leaders. Who will want to be a contributor in politics if they are not being represented? What politicians are inspiring the cultivation of future generations of leaders?

A polling type that accounts for this self-expression and the public’s ability to engage meaningfully with complex policy issues, Mansbridge shares, are deliberative polls that are composed of individuals who might not normally engage in political discussions, but who are incentivized to participate through structured opportunities. As a result, they often leave more informed than they came, contributing to belief updating and less polarization, which opens them to future compromise. (30:34) Public consensus demonstrates the benefits of deliberative democracy to promote more thoughtful and inclusive public engagement than jury duty, for example. Mansbridge finds that the attitudes towards the different polling methods are completely different, even though they are both randomly chosen. I have had personal experience with jury duty and affirm that it is more dreaded and burdensome for individuals, while a deliberative poll with incentives, I could imagine, would be an exciting environment
someone chooses to experience, versus just being forced to.

Another point of contention is the level of demands required from a person, including time, money, and commitment. She poses the hypothetical idea of intervention with a state representative, and if there could be more communication between them and their constituents, then that would lead to a higher sense of personal responsibility (38:30). Both agree that fewer demands within polling lead to more people wanting to engage in political surveying, and will produce a better representation, and having higher demands will lead to fewer participants and also will not reap beneficial results, bringing on the extremes.

Again, referring to the u-curve, and how media has allowed for polarization and mass media to function correlatively with others. Glynn states, “Correlation tends to produce social consensus—not necessarily unanimity of opinion, but at least some shared sense of where people stand” (Glynn et al. 2015, 341). At the root, the level of investment one person has in the policies that are made, shape their willingness to participate in polling, their desire to vote, and ultimately, the health of a functioning democracy. The fundamental challenge of developing a healthy, engaged, and informed public remains as pressing today as it was in the past. Addressing a polarized world requires a cultural shift in how we listen, not just how we speak. As we continue into an increasingly digital future, the challenge will be not just how we speak to one another in person, but also our online interactions. While the media’s influence on political discourse is undeniable, the evolution of FDR’s fireside chats to today’s social media platforms clearly shows how the tools of public communication have altered the message and impression political leaders portray. Sustaining a functioning democracy requires more than simply absorbing what media algorithms produce, but decisively choosing to engage healthily with media for the betterment of oneself.

Mansbridge advocates for more nuanced understandings rooted in bipartisanship and shared responsibility, a perspective that finds practical expression in mechanisms like deliberative polling. Although deliberative democracy may not be suitable for every political issue, these methods offer a promising way forward for inviting informed public engagement. These approaches encourage citizens to be active participants in the democratic process, utilizing media technology in enlightening ways, rather than merely passive recipients of information and doom-scrolling. By fostering inclusive and open discussions among citizens, we can establish a nation of strong and legitimate political decision-makers.

References

Glynn, Carroll J., Susan Herbst, Mark Lindeman, Garrett J, O’Keefe and Robert J. Shapiro. 2018 Public Opinion. Routledge.

Dr. Robin Lauermann, professor of politics, edits this series

Welcome to the seventh season of our student blog series, From the Field! If you are new to this series, check out our introduction to the series Welcome and Introduction to From the Field. 

Last spring, students in my Polling and Public Opinion course explored the social and psychological factors that shape people’s values, beliefs, attitudes and opinions – as well as how those elements shape people’s interactions with the political system. The idea of representative democracy is based on the idea that voters evaluate candidates based on issues and cast votes based on those differences in support of policy directions accordingly, and then hold officials accountable at the ballot box. Research shows that the public’s issue voting has increased in the last several elections due to the clarity of stances offered by polarized candidates 

Research such as my own and Stanford’s Morris Fiorina, however, suggests that feelings, rather than issues, have driven candidate evaluations and voting – and not in positive ways. Fiorina’s work indicates that polarized candidates do not represent the bulk of voters, who are predominantly center-left to center-right. Voters then react in the next election to policy overreach as leaders cater to their polarized bases. Moreover, the feelings factor in the last several election cycles has resulted more from negative reaction against the opposing candidate, rather than a strong vote in favor of the chosen candidates. The result is increasing public dissatisfaction. Scholars and practitioners have sought solutions to improve democracy through more effective input from citizens to their elected officials. 

As a final experience for the course, students applied their knowledge to analyze an episode of The Gray Area, which featured an interview with Dr. Jane Mansbridge, who has authored numerous books on democracy, including Deliberative Systems: Deliberative Democracy at the Large Scale. In this approach, citizens gather for deeper discussions to learn more about issues, sharing their views and experiences. Through the process, they not only deepen their own understanding but also see how issues affect others in different ways. The result is a better sense of the problems we face and possible solutions that are more likely to address the issues and lessen the negative effects of policies.  

The posts that follow share the excellent insights from our students in response.

 

Aliza Alton is a senior Politics and International major with a concentration in American Politics

This post is the sixth and final one of this season of From the Field.  If you have not yet done so, please read this brief post by the series editor introducing our focus for the season.

It stands to reason that the American political climate is highly polarized and the American people are dissatisfied with the status quo. This dissatisfaction with party polarization was foreshadowed as early as 1787 when James Madison wrote about the complaints heard everywhere regarding polarized and overbearing political groups. There are a plethora of ways that major parties might be reformed to cater to the sub-factions of their constituents. However, many political scholars suggest that more representation for minor parties will improve our government structure. Although minor parties, using the example of the Constitution Party, stand as a symbol of democracy and can even be used strategically during elections, the two-party system around which our nation has formed offers invaluable stability during times of mass polarization. To maintain this reliability the American people have grown so accustomed to, while also improving voter satisfaction, our political leaders may look to campaign solutions such as information-driven heuristics and increased representation for larger groups of constituents to reduce polarization and political dissatisfaction.

Minor parties stand as a symbol of our democratic process and the representation our founding fathers envisioned, remaining prevalent in our modern political sphere. The Constitution Party, for instance, was founded by Howard Phillips in 1992 after President Bush reneged on the ongoing “No New Taxes” pledge that he had promised to maintain. Their initial policy focus was on fiscal reform. However, they have expanded to address a plethora of issues, developing an extremely conservative perspective. They are particularly interested in restraining the Supreme Court, and its political statements, such as in Obergefell v. Hodges. The three pillars of their mission statement are Integrity, Liberty, and Prosperity, and this is intended to reflect the patriotic values that they uphold. Hyper-specific values offer greater representation,  cater to a specific demographic, and give greater representation to those who feel that the Republican party does not give conservative issues the due diligence necessary to enact true policy reform. There is a sub-sector of citizens who deeply resonate with the motives and principles of the Constitution Party, just as there is for every minor party.

Although the Constitution Party gives representation to a portion of the American people, meeting a constituent’s exact preference does not always, nor should it always, translate into feasible election results. The Party has had minimal success, gaining traction with Howard Phillip’s presidential campaigns in the 90s, and obtaining ballot access to 22 states in 1992. They currently have access to 15 state ballots. One of their most notable achievements is the election of congressional candidate Rick Jore to the Montana House of Representatives in 2006. Although they are the third most popular American minor Party, following the Libertarian and Green parties, the hundreds or thousands of votes that they receive on their ballots are not comparable to the hundreds of millions the major parties receive at every election.

The current two-party political system has stood the test of time amid party realignment, government reform, and polarization, and has been the status quo for most of American history. When we consider the longstanding history of support that America has for our two-party system through the lack thereof for third parties, the opportunity for a minor party to reach success is bleak. Except for Maine and Nebraska, the plurality/winner-take-all system used by most states leads to dominant parties remaining in the Presidential office. Through a combination of many legislative factors, the logistical structure of American politics indirectly supports the two-party system.

Political scholars express concern that more representation for minor parties will oversaturate our political and government structure. “[A two-party system] serves the need of a democracy to hold public officials accountable to the electorate . . . and gives legitimacy to the efforts of those public officials as they seek reconciliation and unity on the issues that divide a vast and diverse nation”. They concluded that major parties should be incentivized through a referendum of support or dissatisfaction to adjust their policies and political methods to fit the public that they serve. This argument is not based on a lack of faith in the general public, but rather the reality of a decline in voter turnout, and the limited research the average voter is willing to do leading up to the election. Minor parties, generally speaking, are motivated by a specific policy concentration and focus solely on those issues. Collective action, or compromise, and majority leadership have served as the driving force for much of policy enactment, both of which minor parties lack by nature. Major parties, in contrast, have the funding, media exposure, and general experience to operate on the scale that citizens need, while compelling voters to settle in a way that honors the democratic process. As political scientists suggest, the responsibility should be placed on major parties to better represent their nation.

In regards to the future of minor parties and their place in American politics, many scholars see a promising future for their effects on congressional elections. Dr. Salka’s empirical research concludes that “In every state, the presence of a minor party candidate was associated with a statistically significant decline in the vote share for one or both of the major parties”. This study observes the Protest Hypothesis primarily, which claims that in the presence of a minor party, the major Party with the most similar values will lose a portion of votes to the said minor party. Put simply, minor parties can be used strategically.

An example of minor parties’ strategic use in elections is the candidacy of Ross Perot during the 1992 presidential election. He was the independent candidate running against Bill Clinton, and Republican incumbent, George Bush. Although he did not receive electoral votes, he garnered over 19% of the popular vote, aiding in Clinton’s ultimate victory. Perot’s fiscal prowess and bi-partisanship detracted Republican votes from Bush. Professor Salka’s research suggests that in at least 7 states there was a significant impact on the outcome of a congressional election based on the presence of minor parties on the ballot. This leads to the conclusion that minor parties serve a purpose in our democratic process that exceeds symbolism and transcends into strategy, allowing citizens to protest against policies and political patterns that they do not align with. While the data from both Ross Perot and the Constitution Party demonstrate a lack of probable electoral victory, the statistics suggest that minor parties have a hopeful strategic and symbolic place in American politics.

The argument that minor parties play a significant role in aiding dominant two-party systems remains prevalent. However, some research alludes to a larger issue. When citizens hold “wrong perceptions” about their politicians, it leaves them confused about the political process and the legislative impact that their politician truly makes. They feel the effects of misrepresentation but are not able to hold the responsible party accountable through elections. The lack of knowledge that voters have about just two political parties who go out of their way to create heuristics. The Constitution Party advocates for gun rights, religious freedom, and a conservative judiciary. These policy stances are far too similar to the Republican party’s to make a substantial difference in the average voter’s mind. If the catchy slogans and commercials for major parties are not reaching the average American, can we expect them to research a plethora of minor parties?

If I were to propose a solution to political polarization and lack of representation in the two-party system for which I advocate, I would suggest more precise and information-driven campaign strategies, focused on catering to larger groups of constituents. Creating an accurate, yet broadened representation of policy intentions while on the campaign trail would help voters make a decision that they can feel more satisfied with. It should be noted that the increase in candidate information and reform accuracy may not require a drastic influx in voter research or preparation. “The “low information rationality” theory states that voters do not need to possess “encyclopedic knowledge” to make reasonable decisions”. Although knowledge is invaluable to our understanding of any topic, Walder demonstrates that it is possible to adequately inform voters on political policies and their part in sculpting reform without overwhelming them with information. Walder claims that voters are more satisfied long-term with their decision when they use partisan heuristics. Partisan heuristics refer to mental shortcuts used to make ballot decisions using sufficient information given the limited time constraint of elections. An example of this would be social media algorithms and their tendency to perpetuate confirmation bias. A study found that “Voters with a low level of political knowledge hold wrong perceptions of parties’ vote recommendations in 24.5%, those with medium knowledge in 18.4%, and those with high knowledge only in 13.8% of the cases”. The confirmation that the average voter can make informed and satisfying decisions using partisan heuristics demonstrates that campaign reform in the two-party system would significantly impact our political landscape for the better.

While retention of minor parties is vital for democracy both symbolically and strategically, our nation could benefit from heightened party representation and an improvement in political understanding over the long term. When political parties are held subject to citizens who truly understand the issues at stake and the candidate for which they are voting, they are forced to cater to a larger, more diverse audience to obtain votes. As political scientists are finding, polarization is perpetuated, partially, due to citizen’s reliance on misinformation and lack of knowledge. Although minor parties, such as the Constitution Party, can stand as a reminder that democracy is pivotal to the success of our society, and add to the legitimacy of a major party’s election to office, the reasons listed above all lead toward a reliance on the two-party system that our founding fathers advocated for. A combination of campaign reform regarding increased heuristics, leading to a rise in civic education and voter satisfaction, and the reliance we currently have on the stability and strength that a two-party system offers may lead to optimistic change in our current political climate.

Louka Fetter is a junior majoring in both Politics and International Relations as well as Economics.

This post is the fifth of this season of From the Field.  If you have not yet done so, please read this brief post by the series editor introducing our focus for the season.

Despite record numbers of American voters declining to affiliate with either major party, both of which they increasingly doubt really represent their interests, the two-party stranglehold on American politics is as strong as ever. According to historic polling data, the percentage of voters identifying as independents has climbed from 31% to 43% in the past twenty years, while the percentage citing Republican or Democratic affiliation has plummeted. However, this century’s elections have seen a negligible number of ballots cast for third parties, which stands in stark contrast to a century ago when a variety of minor parties won meaningful shares of the vote. One such party was the Socialist Party of America, considered by some to be “the most important minor political party in the history of the United States in the twentieth century” because it achieved success in having many of its policy proposals implemented (xvii). However, a closer dive into the party’s history unveils a theme common to many minor parties in which its success – the implementation of its policy proposals – was also the reason for its downfall. Only through electoral reform allowing voters to express their genuine preference for their favorite candidate, such as ranked choice voting, might third parties be viable in future American elections.

The Socialist Party of America (Socialist Party) was founded in 1901 and experienced a swift rise to relevance in the decade that followed. The party enjoyed a quick ascent in part because it was formed from several existing groups, like the Populist movement and the Socialist Labor Party, allowing it to generate support from coal miners, laborers, and the working class (53). At first, the party differentiated itself as a left-wing alternative by proposing state involvement and asserting the futility of capitalism in proposing solutions to the economic issues of the day, including child labor, wealth inequality, and urban poverty. The party grew its support across the nation, enjoying its greatest electoral success in 1912 when it earned 900,000 votes in the presidential election – 6% of the total vote – and captured over a thousand offices across the nation (287). Bearing many of the hallmarks of a major party in development, the prevailing expectation by the 1910s was that the Socialist Party would continue to develop to compete as a major party in American politics (xvii).

However, the Socialist Party ultimately lost viability by suffering from the same fate that befell many other minor parties in American history. Throughout the early 1900s, the major parties absorbed and co-opted much of the ideology and policy proposals of the Socialist Party, rendering the party unable to present itself as a viable and differentiated alternative (51, 60). This phenomenon was especially apparent at two crucial points in the development of the Socialist Party – the elections of 1912 and the Great Depression – when the party’s viability was undercut at moments when it seemed poised to flourish. While 1912 did mark the party’s greatest success, the party was disappointed because it had expected to garner up to 3 million votes, and it fell short of expectations because of the major parties’ appeals to the same progressive and reform-minded base that the Socialists pursued (62). Democratic nominee Woodrow Wilson was a devoted progressive, and former Republican president Theodore Roosevelt was so left-wing to be accused by the Socialists of being excessive and insincere and “stealing the Socialist’s issues” (62). These two candidates garnered a significant number of votes that might have otherwise gone to the Socialist Party because they were perceived as more electorally viable options that would pursue similar left-wing policies.

The party fell victim to the same fate after it was granted new life with the difficult economic conditions surrounding the Great Depression, which increased its appeal (308). However, this revival was short-lived after Roosevelt and the Democratic Party advocated for many of the same policies as the Socialists in addressing the Depression through their New Deal platform. The Socialist Party had long advocated for major legislation including the shortening of the workday, increased inspection of factories, mines, and shops, an end to child labor, the prohibition on interstate shipment of goods made from child labor, a minimum wage law, and a graduated income tax. If many of these policies sound familiar, it is because they were implemented by Democrats as a part of the New Deal. Many supporters of these policies voted for the Democrats, a more viable electoral option, instead of the Socialist Party, with the hopes that these policies would be implemented. Moreover, many members of the Socialist Party increasingly left to join the Democrats after the passage of the New Deal because this success demonstrated the emergence of a viable way to implement left-wing policy. To the Socialist Party’s disillusionment, as soon as economic conditions arose that warranted the implementation of their left-wing policy, the Democrat Party was there to adopt and implement those policies as their own. As a result, the New Deal permanently destroyed the viability of the Socialist Party, for it failed to stand as either a clearly differentiated or electorally viable alternative to the major parties.

During two critical moments of the Socialist Party’s existence where success was anticipated, the party failed to prove itself as a feasible alternative. Both disappointments are largely due to the same phenomenon – the absorption of the Socialist Party’s positions by the major parties in America. Both major parties are very flexible and able to adapt to absorb different issues, movements, or ideologies to maintain the current two-party system (344). This development also serves to prevent minor parties from developing or maintaining a constituency, rendering them unable to supply voters with a differentiated and viable alternative and thereby affirming the two-party stranglehold on the American political system.

For minor parties to be viable in American politics, voters need an incentive to support them regardless of their chances of beating the two major parties, which might be accomplished through reforms like the implementation of ranked choice voting. Ranked choice voting is an electoral system recently implemented in several areas across the country where voters have the option to rank every candidate on the ballot according to their ordinal preferences (366). Ranked choice voting has been shown to increase the frequency of votes for minor parties by between 200% and nearly 400%, showing that “ranked-choice voting may play an important role in increasing the electoral performance of third-party candidates” (374). Ranked choice voting allows voters to express their first-choice vote for a minor party without having the fear of their vote being wasted when also choosing between the major parties. While there are some challenges with ranked-choice voting, like ballot exhaustion, the need for voter education, and the potential for voter confusion, this reform seems to represent the best option for promoting the success of minor parties.

The Socialist Party greatly influenced American politics through its advocacy of left-wing economic legislation that was eventually instituted as policy. However, the Socialist Party failed to achieve viability because its policies were absorbed by the major parties during two crucial episodes, the 1912 election and the Great Depression. As a result, the Socialist Party failed to gain lasting traction and ascend to major party status. Changes to the American voting system, such as ranked-choice voting, could allow for genuine party preferences to be expressed at the ballot box. Such a change might also provide an opportunity for various minor parties to increase in viability and contribute once more to the increased representativeness of the American political system.

Jordan Gilman is a junior majoring in Politics and also in Economics.

This post is the fourth of this season of From the Field.  If you have not yet done so, please read this brief post by the series editor introducing our focus for the season.

Third parties in America are often seen as accessories to the political order, not serving a foundational role but still making their voices heard. Voting for a third party has been seen by some as lending a hand to the opposition, taking away much-needed votes from either Republicans or Democrats. For example, Hillary Clinton mailed over a million flyers that cautioned against voting for a third-party candidate in 2016, claiming that doing so helped Donald Trump. In recent elections, these organizations made enough of an impact to garner national attention but have failed to challenge America’s two-party system. The Know-Nothing movement in the 1850s was arguably America’s first third party, campaigning on issues related to immigration. Its existence was short-lived but still impactful, showing how voters across a deeply divided country were unified by nativist ideas. Even though this party has long been dead, its role as a release valve for discontent with the two-party system echoes across time and into the present day, providing insight into viable solutions towards increasing the role of third parties.

The Know-Nothing Party began in response to the overwhelming nativist sentiment of the 1850s and took advantage of the Whigs’ poor performance in addressing Catholic immigration. University of Virginia professor Michael Holt described how despite making nativist appeals, the Whigs rarely “acted against Catholics specifically” and lost touch with their working-class voters as a result (pg. 314). Even more than the Democrats, the Whigs were led by political elites insulated from the pressures of Catholic immigration. Without a party to represent these pressing issues, many Northerners turned to the Know-Nothing party, which had taken an abundantly clear stance on immigration despite its brief history.

Beginning as The Order of the Star Spangled Banner in 1850, this Nativist movement originally resembled a sort of secret society, urging its members to say that they “know nothing” of the party (pg. 6). Soon the Know-Nothings would become anything but secret, experiencing success in New York with lawyer Daniel Ullmann, who earned more than a quarter of all ballots cast in that state and its leading city to the shock of many onlookers (pg. 460). The party’s nativist appeals had struck a chord in New York, later diffusing to other areas in the Northeast and even across the country.

At its peak, the Know-Nothings were America’s first dominant third party, providing an alternative for voters dissatisfied with the political establishment. Unlike many grassroots movements, the Know-Nothings achieved political efficacy by electing over a hundred Congressmen, eight governors, a controlling share of state legislature seats across the country, and thousands of local politicians. The party even recruited former president (and Whig member) Millard Fillmore to run as a Know-Nothing in the 1956 election. Despite this surprising and seeming sudden success, the party failed to capture the Executive Branch, with Fillmore only winning one state in 1956 (pg. 30). The impact of the Know-Nothings was felt most acutely on the state level, transforming local politics in different ways in various states in the 1850s.

Taking an indecisive stance on slavery initially broadened the horizons of the Know-Nothing party but caused a reckoning when the nation moved towards civil war. From the Dred Scott ruling to the Lincoln-Douglas debates, there was no shortage of controversy over slavery and its future. The party was built around brushing slavery aside, hoping to find unity in other areas and create a truly national movement in the process. But in an era on the verge of civil war, there was no path toward unity without confronting slavery head-on. The Know-Nothings made the same fatal mistakes as the Whigs by underestimating the divisiveness of slavery. As the nation divided, the Know-Nothings became gradually more irrelevant, losing their role as a political force and instead becoming a party of the past. The Know-Nothings were a casualty on the way toward civil war, unable to sustain themselves amid better political alternatives.

Despite the death of this third party, the discontentment that fueled its rise still rings true centuries later in contemporary American politics. Issues continue to plague the American public that seems to be underrepresented in America, making many citizens dissatisfied with the two-party system. A proposed solution towards giving third parties more influence includes rank-choice voting, which (as its name suggests) allows candidates to be ranked in order of preference on a ballot. This system lowers the stakes for third parties, no longer facing an all-or-nothing dilemma. A survey experiment sought to understand the effectiveness of rank-choice voting, particularly related to third parties. The research found there to be a strong connection between hypothetical ranked-choice voting and support of third-party candidates (pg. 374). Respondents using RCV criteria showed nearly double the level of support of third parties in the 2020 election than those using a non-RVC system. RCV has the potential to create a more level political playing field and lend a helping hand to third parties.

Even though these conclusions made by Simmons and his team rely more on questionnaires than electoral data, RVC has shown results in real-world elections. For example, Alaska implemented this electoral reform in 2022, using it in elections for governor and Congress.  Maine has also been a proponent of RCV and has seen increased governmental approval ratings ever since. These well-documented benefits leave observers wondering why RCV is not more popular. A reason for its slow diffusion has been the hesitation of some conservatives, more reluctant to introduce this electoral reform. Research has found many voters to find the run-off model is more satisfying – especially in come-from-behind victories (pg. 36). Even more significant is the potential dissatisfaction voters will have with RCV once it becomes more familiar, losing its novelty and promising impacts. Only time will truly be able to tell the future of elections in America, but proponents are hopeful that these doubts will be overwhelmed by the resounding benefits of this electoral reform.

Today, third parties represent issues as diverse as environmental regulation to libertarian causes, all of which can have a unique contribution to the political atmosphere. Rank-choice voting helps these parties, providing a solution that keeps the broader electoral system intact while also introducing needed reform. By doing away with binary decisions at the ballot and moving towards a ranking system, third parties are given more of a chance at competing, able to represent unique issues to their supporters. Like anything in American politics, uprooting the status quo is difficult, but RCV has shown significant progress here. One can only wonder how the Know-Nothing party would have fared in an RCV system, perhaps able to retain some of its influence instead of being a casualty of the Civil War. However, what observers do know is that these third parties will continue to persist in American politics, potentially serving an even larger role in the future.

Lydia Ring is a junior majoring in Politics, with concentration in American Politics, as well as Economics

 

This post is the third of this season of From the Field.  If you have not yet done so, please read this brief post by the series editor introducing our focus for the season.

In the years leading up to the American Civil War, slavery was one of the topics that drew the most attention in national politics. In his book, Liberty Power, Corey M. Brooks suggests that in advance of the 1848 presidential election, the two major parties (Whigs and Democrats) were having difficulty unifying on the issue of slavery and its expansion into the new territories (129). In response, the Free Soil Party was formed in 1848. The new minor party opposed the expansion of slavery. The Free Soil Party only existed for six years before it was absorbed into the newly forming Republican Party. Its agenda may have been too narrowly tailored with its sole focus on the issue of expanding slavery rather than the larger abolitionist cause, causing the party to lose relevance and support following the Compromise of 1850.

Despite the short existence of the Free Soil Party, it offers a valuable lens through which minor parties in America can be considered. An examination of the Free Soil Party reveals that this minor party had a significant impact on the larger political scene and suggests reform related to minor parties today. The Free Soil’s impact on the US party system can be seen in three major areas: its influence in making the issue of slavery important, the end of the Whig Party, and the formation of the Republican Party. Furthermore, a consideration of the Free Soil Party suggests ranked-choice voting as a helpful reform to help third parties today have long-term electoral success.

Regarding the influence of the Free Soil Party, this party first brought the expansion of slavery to the center of national politics, making it a national debate on which any party desiring to remain viable must take a stance. According to the Lawsons in their book, Race and Ethnicity in America, the unsuccessful yet well-known proposition of the Wilmot Proviso in 1946 suggested that the US should not allow slavery in any territories obtained from Mexico, which made the expansion of slavery a relevant debate (443). The Wilmot Proviso gave the Free Soil Party an opportunity to reorganize the party system around positions on slavery. The Free Soil Party took an emerging national debate and made it the defining issue of the time. The pressure imposed by the Free Soil Party in this way had great implications for the political system as a whole. For the existing major parties such as the Whig and Democratic Parties, there was division on this issue. The Free Soil Party’s creation placed existing parties under pressure in this area, leading to major shifts within the US party system as a whole.

Second, the Free Soil Party’s influence can be seen in the demise of the Whig Party following the 1852 election. When the Free Soil Party declared itself and its antislavery stance, natural party sorting occurred. Both Whigs and Democrats who were strongly antislavery abandoned their former party to join this new effort. According to Stephen Buck’s analysis of the national political scene in 1852, as the Free Soil Party gained momentum, the Whig Party “failed to grasp the importance of the slavery issue, instead continuing to focus on economic issues as the real problem” (48). While the Free Soil Party was tapping into the relevance of the slavery debate regarding US territories, the Whigs became increasingly irrelevant due to their inability to take a position on this important issue. The Free Soil Party’s push for debate on the issue of slavery highlighted divisions within the Whig Party on this topic and led to their eventual collapse. Many Southern Whigs joined the Democratic Party, while many Northern Whigs joined the antislavery forces in the North.

Third, the influence of the Free Soil Party is revealed in the unification of many Northern antislavery advocates in the newly forming Republican Party. While the Free Soil Party ceased operations in 1954, it was influential in helping the Republican Party establish itself using this issue of slavery. During the 1950s, the larger political system was characterized by confusion due to a lack of clarity among Whigs and Democrats on the issue of slavery. Buck also argues that “the problem of party identity began to clear during the 1854 campaign as the county Free-Soil Party declared its allegiance to the nascent Republican Party” (50). Now, with the endorsement of the Free Soil Party, the Republican Party could act as a place for antislavery advocates to unite. With this transition, the political system was completely transformed and America’s 3rd party system was created. Today, the Republican Party has evolved into one of the two major parties that dictate national politics.

To help minor parties today avoid the end that the Free Soil Party faced, ranked-choice voting emerges as a helpful reform. Many minor parties today are still struggling to gain sufficient momentum to hold seats in political offices and implement policies related to their platforms. Ranked-choice voting responds effectively to these issues without requiring an amendment to the Constitution or congressional law. When voters have the opportunity to rank candidates, it eliminates the idea of a wasted vote and encourages voters to give third-party candidates a chance. In the first empirical study examining ranked-choice voting, Gutierrez, Simmons, and Transue used survey research to evaluate the extent to which this voting system could boost electoral support for third-party candidates and found a strong relationship between ranked-choice voting and support for third-party candidates (374). The biggest concern with ranked-choice voting is that it has the potential to make political involvement even more confusing and demanding for the average American, which would discourage rather than encourage voter participation. While this reform would require an adjustment period to educate and assist Americans in this new system, the long-term value outweighs the short-term cost.

Promoting minor parties through reform is valuable because it will provide greater representation for political moderates who are currently dissatisfied with the two polarized extremes within the US political system. As explained by a political theory known as DuVerger’s Law, America’s use of single-member districts with plurality elections is expected to produce a two-party system. Research by Morris Fiorina in Unstable Majorities indicates that a polarized two-party system is not helpful because the average American is not as politically extreme as those who are highly involved in politics. This disparity leads to ineffective representation of the vast majority of the American public. Increasing the success of minor parties within the American system will allow for a more effective representation of America’s diverse population.

The Free Soil Party provides a valuable lens for evaluating minor parties in America. While the party was influential in shaping political transitions during the 1840s and 1850s that had enduring impacts, its ultimate failure to become an enduring organization suggests the need for institutional reform. The recommendation of ranked-choice voting offers an opportunity to strengthen minor parties and, through this growth, promote better representation for the average American in today’s party system. While the two-party system is deeply rooted in American politics, change is not impossible. Institutional reform in the form of ranked-choice voting is a promising option for the future success of minor parties and addresses key issues within today’s two-party system.

Braden Glenny is a sophomore Politics major pursuing a concentration in American Politics

This post is the second of this season of From the Field.  If you have not yet done so, please read this brief post by the series editor introducing our focus for the season.

Throughout American history, many minor political parties have risen for specific reasons and failed to gain large amounts of traction in the long term. One such party is the American Independent Party, a far-right political party founded in 1967. It reached its peak in 1968, with the nomination of Alabama Governor George Wallace for president as a more conservative alternative to the two main parties. The American Independent Party successfully pushed the much larger Republican Party further to the right. It, along with other minor parties in the United States, could potentially gain more prominence if changes occur to the election process, such as implementing multi-member districts and loosening requirements for ballot access.

The creation of the American Independent Party was the direct result of dissatisfaction among primarily members of the Democratic Party. Many conservative Democrats felt disillusioned with what they viewed as an increasing “hostility of the national party’s policies toward the interests of their region” (30). The supporters of the American Independent Party viewed efforts by the federal government to enforce desegregation as an unconstitutional action against the rights of the states. The official American Independent Party platform from 1968 claims that the federal government was violating the Tenth Amendment by taking control over “rights and privileges of the individual citizen, which are properly subject to state or local control, as distinguished from federal control”. Along with this key issue, the American Independent Party had a platform which could be broadly categorized as socially conservative, economically populist and anti-elitist (30). This platform provided a broader sense of appeal, which helped the party expand its base.

The American Independent Party was the most successful during the 1968 presidential election, which it greatly influenced. In 1968, the party nominated Governor George C. Wallace, a Democrat from Alabama, for President. Wallace had previously run as a Democrat in 1964, competing in primaries against incumbent Lyndon B. Johnson in “Wisconsin, Indiana, and Maryland—and surprised political observers by winning between 30 percent and 43 percent of the popular vote in these contests” (8). Such a performance seemingly proved that Wallace’s platform had popular support nationwide. There was a serious concern that Wallace could deadlock the Electoral College and use that as leverage against the two main parties in hopes of receiving concessions. In the end, he received 13.53 percent of the popular vote and carried five states worth 45 electoral votes in total (31). Wallace still remains the most recent third party candidate to win state votes in the Electoral College.

Wallace would return to the Democratic Party in 1972 and the AIP would attempt to go on without his candidacy to elevate them. However, they would only receive 1.4% of the popular vote in the 1972 election (9). The party had a major schism in 1976, splitting their already minuscule vote total (31). Today, only the California affiliate of the American Independent Party remains operational, where they play “an active role in state politics”. They continue to influence elections in California primarily by endorsing candidates running as part of the much larger Republican Party (Endorsements). Although the party remains active in this form, it has zero presence on the national stage. How has the AIP influenced the system, if it has accomplished little electorally?

The AIP played a major part in the American political scene by helping jump-start the so-called “Southern Strategy” and shift the Republican Party in a more conservative direction. Prior to the 1960s, the American South was solidly Democratic at every level of government. However, the Democratic Party nationally would begin to become more liberal. The AIP in 1968 gave many formerly hardline Democrats an opportunity to consider the potential of an alternative party. Nixon would adopt many tennets of Wallace’s 1968 campaign, such as support for law enforcement. This action would lead many white working-class voters in the South to defect to the Republican side, pushing the party further to the right. Since then, the South has been a major point of focus with how campaigns conduct themselves rhetorically. The AIP had successfully taught both parties that you cannot ignore the interests of the South (31). The desire for a third electorally viable party in the United States is nothing new. However, as explained previously, this momentum is not permanent. Why could there not be a third major party under normal circumstances? What can be done to make minor parties more viable?

The United States has been dominated by a two-party system since the 1820s. One common explanation often utilized by scholars is that this is due to what is known as Duverger’s law. To simplify, Duverger’s law essentially states that single-member districts with a first-past-the-post voting system are more likely to result in two-party systems. Some reformers suggest that if US states were to adopt some form of proportionally represented multi-member district for legislative seats, the two-party system weaken. However, it is currently illegal for states to apportion their congressional seats in a multi-member fashion. An act of Congress repealing the law in place would be a necessity. Multi-member districts, particularly statewide ones, may be in violation of the Voting Rights Act if there is a significant minority population. Additionally, ten states already utilize some form of multi-member district for their state legislatures (2013). Despite this, nearly all of these state legislative seats are controlled by the two main parties (2013). Therefore, it is debatable whether multi-member districts make much difference by themselves.

In addition to implementing multi-member districts, changing laws restricting ballot access could also benefit minor parties. Many state election laws are often tailored specifically to hurt these less prominent parties. For example, to appear on the ballot in Pennsylvania, an independent or minor party candidate must obtain a number of signatures equivalent to two percent of voters in the highest turnout election for the office being sought after (Ballot access requirements for political candidates in Pennsylvania), which often adds up to a much higher total than the number required from “ballot qualified” parties. In addition to having to meet extensive signature requirements, candidates must pay a filing fee, which is much easier for Democratic or Republican candidates to afford due to having access to far more resources. Such laws often make it near impossible for independent or minor party candidates to appear on the ballot and changing them would give minor parties a fairer chance.

The American Independent Party is an American far-right party founded in 1967 due to the dissatisfaction of conservative southern Democrats with the state of national politics. It performed well in the 1968 presidential election due to the name recognition provided by Alabama governor George C. Wallace. However, after he returned to the Democratic Party, the AIP began to fall apart. The AIP successfully pushed the greater Republican Party further to the right and brought the desired attention to southern interests. While the two-party system has existed in the United States for centuries, certain reforms such as implementing multi-member districts and loosening ballot access requirements can help boost minor parties. Additionally, even if they do not directly win elections, minor parties can have a major impact on the American political landscape, just as the American Independent Party did.

 

Dr. Robin Lauermann, professor of politics, edits this series

This post is the first of this season – our sixth – of From the Field.  If you have not yet done so, read our introduction to the seriesWelcome and Introduction to From the Field.

In the spring of 2020, we launched the From the Field series with a set of analyses on the American party system. A durable feature of the system has been its centering around two parties since 1800, when party labels first appeared on the ballot, except for a short, aptly named “Era of Good Feelings” in the early 1800s. Since the 1860s, the Democrats and Republicans have formed a sort of “duopoly” though the substance of their respective platforms and their voter coalitions have varied dramatically over time. Among other factors, the primacy of winner-take-all elections — in the form of single-member plurality and single-member majority contests — has discouraged the ability of minor parties to compete. As a result, a narrative has developed that minor parties do not matter if they cannot compete and win seats. This past spring, students in the Parties and Elections found that this narrative is not especially accurate.

Examining select parties throughout political history, they uncovered a rich web of effects on the party system and the resulting policies produced by it. As we pulled together findings from across their projects, we saw repeatedly that minor parties were more than election “spoilers”. Minor party presence and electoral support offer at minimum what political scientists term a “safety valve” for portions of the public that felt unrepresented by the existing choices. Even more importantly, their activity prodded the main parties to bring issues into their agendas, resulting in policies that seemed unlikely before the third parties mustered their efforts. In short, even when third parties do not win office – not to mention sizeable minorities or majorities – they still matter. (Note: research on these parties intends to contribute to our knowledge and does not serve as an endorsement for any party or their issue stances.)

Not dismissing the challenges of third parties to compete, students also delved into potential reforms and their limitations. Some reforms, such as ranked-choice voting, require only changes in law and can occur within our existing constitutional system. Others are improbable without constitutional amendments and related changes to our presidential system of government. These analyses show the important considerations – and most often the tradeoffs – that make reforms a slow process.

Several students have distilled their academic research essays into blog posts to share with you, complete with relevant sources for you to pursue further if you wish. Equipped with this knowledge, voters can make more informed decisions.

 

Read on for the first post in this new season

Gabriella Kovalchick is a rising senior, majoring in Politics and International Relations with an American Politics Concentration

This post is the final one of this season of From the Field.  If you have not yet done so, read this brief post introducing Unstable Majoritieswhich includes not only a background on the book but also some amazingly helpful resources.

For our final book in the Politics Seminar, the subject moved towards a growing problem in the United States political scene. In Morris Fiorina’s Unstable Majorities: Polarization, Party Sorting & Political Stalemate, Fiorina addresses the growing phenomena of polarization looking at U.S. history, other countries, and the 2016 presidential election. Taking time to lay foundational knowledge, this book was similar to our previous book in that it was accessible to individuals in and outside the field of politics. In response to this book and our discussions in class, while I often am pessimistic about our current political climate, I was ultimately convinced that there is hope for our system because we are resilient.

There are many dilemmas discussed in Unstable Majorites, but a primary one illustrated in the text is the overreach of political parties. Fiorina provides a simple definition stating, “By overreach, I mean simply that after it wins control of an elected institution, particularly when it wins control of all three elected institutions, a party attempts to govern in a manner that alienates the marginal members of its electoral majority” (93). Leading up to overreach, we are seeing a growing population of independents. Our current political parties are not representing the public, leading to party bases that encompass more extreme ideologies, and independent voters swinging between parties. This large population of independents primarily interacts with important elections, leaving the base supporters interacting with the rest, continuing the dilemma of parties not representing the people. However, in light of this book and class discussions, this dilemma is known, so it is just a matter of how we address it.

A key point I have taken away from Fiorina’s Unstable Majorities is the impact civic knowledge or lack thereof, has on our current system. Underlying many issues illustrated in this text is whether people know how to interact with the government. In the case of the growing population of independents, campaigns are shifting to target hot topics that sway independents (Chapter 6). People do not necessarily know how to respond to this tactic we have seen with overreach, many of these hot topics are not addressed while individuals are in office, so people need to learn how to look beyond the loud parts of politics. These findings underscore the importance of civic education, which has been a recurring theme in the course.

Although not a point with which I explicitly disagree, Fiorina surprised me by asserting that Trump could have a positive role in change. He suggested, “…Trump might play a positive role as a de-sorter, someone with the potential to disrupt the sorted parties that underlie much of our current political discontent and possibly even begin the construction of a new electoral coalition” (219). It is hard to look at politicians, especially Trump, as a figure of positive change in our political system. However, I can say that he has pointed out many flaws in our system, causing more individuals to call for positive change.

As I mentioned earlier, I always found myself being very pessimistic thinking about the current state of American politics. However, in light of class discussions, I think Fiorina has illustrated with historical comparisons that what we are dealing with is not new (Chapter 9). I have grown to see that we are resilient in working through these times of unstable majorities, and with more public outcry, there are more chances for change. What good does it do to not be hopeful? Even if the government does not explicitly care for the population, people are working every day to bring about justice and change. As an individual, I can continue to advocate for education in the hope that people will gain more hope in our system. It may be complicated, but there is hope that things will get better instead of only worse.